This paper investigates the role that the building of two new power stations, Medupi and Kusile, will play in facilitating future economic activity in South Africa. We use a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to estimate the economy-wide effects of these new power stations. Our simulation results also provide insight into how much the local economy has lost due to inadequate electricity supply in the period leading up to the construction of Medupi and Kusile. We find that the decision to build additional power generation capacity was necessary and justified, and that the failure to sooner recognise the need for expansion of the country's electricity generation capacity and subsequent delays in commissioning Medupi and Kusile, likely cost the economy over R110bn in lost production. Additional analysis, in which a further two-year delay in the construction of Medupi and Kusile is simulated, shows that such an event will cause the economy to perform below baseline projections up to 2022.
Introduction
The electricity grid in South Africa has been under severe pressure in recent years. The local economy has faced an on-going electricity crisis since the first series of regular blackouts and load shedding occurred in 2008. Diminished electricity reserve margins, brought on by a steady increase in demand relative to a stagnant supply, have left the country's electricity sector in desperate need of expansion in order to prevent further catastrophe. Recognising the looming crisis, Plan (IRP) (DoE, 2011; . The key medium term outcome of the New Build
Programme was the construction of two new coal-fired power stations, Medupi and Kusile, with a generation capacity of around 4800 MW each (Eskom, 2007; Eskom, 2010) . With the long lag period that ensued between the planning and start of construction in late 2007, combined with various delays that have occurred during the construction phase, two major questions arise: 1) what will the contribution of Medupi and Kusile be in facilitating economic growth in South Africa going forward, assuming that both power stations will be brought online over the period 2014-2019, and 2) what has the lack of adequate electricity supply during the period [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] cost the South African economy? We also consider a third question: how would a delay in the construction of both power stations affect economic growth in the short run.
In order to answer these empirical questions we use a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the South African economy. To measure and isolate the impact of Medupi and Kusile, we first run a hypothetical policy scenario in which the additional generation capacity scheduled to come online from these new power stations is eliminated, and compare this outcome to a baseline scenario in which Medupi and Kusile are brought online as scheduled. By interrogating the design and results of this policy simulation, we find that it also serves as a useful proxy to understanding how much the lack of adequate electricity supply since 2008 has cost the local economy, which some analysts have estimated to be as high as
R300bn (Roodt, 2014) . Our final policy scenario measures the impact of a two-year delay in the construction of Medupi and Kusile.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 looks at some of the background and literature surrounding the electricity sector in South Africa.
Section 3 describes the CGE methodology and model used in this paper. Section 4 details the design of the policy simulations and gives a careful analysis and interpretation of the results produced by the model. Section 5 concludes the study with a brief overview of the results and relevant policy implications.
Background and Literature
South Africa has historically been an energy-intensive economy 3 , particularly in terms of electricity usage by its industrial sector, consuming well above the world average MWh of electricity on a per capita basis (IEA, 2015) . The reason why the industrial sector in South Africa is so energy-intensive can be traced back to the 1960s. During this period, South Africa experienced a boom in its mining and heavy metals industries, which led to significant increases in electricity demand. In response to the rapidly growing demand for electricity, Eskom built a large number of power stations in a short period of time (Etzinger, 2013) . Additional supply was built to the extent that, during the 1980s and 1990s, electricity was in such oversupply that some power stations were mothballed and electricity sold at heavily subsidised rates to large industrial consumers. As may be expected, plans for the construction of additional electricity supply were not considered during this period. Many industries took advantage of the abundant supply of electricity at cheap and subsidised rates and entrenched itself in various electricity-intensive activities. In response to the growing dependence on cheap electricity for many of these industries, the Energy Intensive Users Group (EIUG) of South Africa, whose members account for over a third of electrical energy consumed in the country, was established in 1999. The EIUG membership comprises of large industries in the fields of mining, materials beneficiation and materials manufacturing. The group's main focus areas are to promote affordable and sustainable electricity prices and the security of electricity supply to its members and the country in general (EIUG, 2015) .
Indeed, the lobbying efforts of the EIUG, combined with long-term contracts, have ensured that many large industrial customers have continued to receive electricity at below, what Eskom considers, cost-reflective levels.
With abundant electricity supply still available during the 1990s, Eskom, the Department of Energy and policymakers were all lulled into a false sense of security regarding South Africa's future electricity infrastructure needs. Between 1994 and 2007, the South African economy grew much faster on average than it had in the previous two decades, which combined with many more households becoming connected to the grid during this period (The Presidency, 2014) (Eskom, 2015) . Apart from improving Eskom's financial position and reducing its reliance on government subsidy, these large electricity price increases were also viewed as a demand-side management (DSM) strategy to help restore the balance between electricity demand and supply. Naturally, industry and consumer groups such as the EIUG protested against these rapid price increases, fearing that it might damage local firms' international competitiveness.
The combination of these events led to a surge in academic research studying the electricity sector in South Africa. Papers such as Alton et al. (2013 ) Blignaut (2012 , Blignaut et al. (2015) ; Inglesi-Lotz & Blignaut (2011; 2012a; 2012b; ; Inglesi & Pouris (2010); Joubert (2015) ; Spalding-Fecher & Khorommbi (2003); and Winkler (2007) , amongst others, have made valuable contributions to the literature across a wide variety of electricity related topics. However, none of these papers used a comprehensive general equilibrium modelling framework to assess the economy-wide effects of Medupi and Kusile, specifically, whilst also measuring the cost of lost production due to inadequate supply in recent years, as we do in this paper.
Methodology
We The ability of CGE models, such as UPGEM, to recognise the many real interlinkages in the economy, and account for price-induced behaviour and resource constraints in determining the economy-wide effects of a shock on the economy over time, has made it one of the preferred methodologies for practical policy analysis around the world (Adams & Parmenter, 2013) . UPGEM is solved using the GEMPACK suite of programs described in Harrison & Pearson (1996) . GEMPACK eliminates linearisation errors by implementing shocks in a series of small steps and updating the database between steps.
Following the CoPS-style of implementing a CGE model, inspired by the pioneering work of Johansen (1960) , the general equilibrium core of UPGEM is made up of a linearised system of equations describing the theory underlying the behaviour of participants in the economy. The specifications in UPGEM recognise each industry as producing one or more commodities, using as inputs combinations of domestic and imported commodities, different types of labour, capital and land.
The multi-input, multi-output production specification is kept manageable by a series of separability assumptions, as illustrated in Appendix C. This nested production structure reduces the number of estimated parameters required by the model. The recursive-dynamic behaviour in UPGEM is specified through equations describing: physical capital accumulation; lagged adjustment processes in the labour market; and changes in the current account and net foreign liability positions.
Capital accumulation is specified separately for each industry and linked to industryspecific net investment in the preceding period. Investment in each industry is positively related to its expected rate of return on capital, reflecting the price of capital rentals relative to the price of capital creation. For the government's fiscal accounts, a similar mechanism for financial asset/liability accumulation is specified.
Changes in the public sector debt are related to the public sector debt incurred during a particular year and the interest payable on previous debt. Adjustments to the national net foreign liability position are related to the annual investment/savings imbalance, revaluations of assets and liabilities and remittance flows during the year.
In policy simulations, the labour market follows a lagged adjustment path where wage rates respond over time to gaps between demand and supply for labour across each of the different occupation groups.
Dynamic CGE models such as UPGEM are designed to quantify the effects of a policy change, or exogenous shock, to the economy, over a period of time. We follow the standard CGE methodology described in Dixon et al. (2013) which determines that the best way to examine the effects of an exogenous shock is to compute the differences between a scenario in which the shock has occurred -the policy simulation -and a counterfactual scenario in which the particular shock under examination did not occur -the baseline scenario. 7 Results are then reported as percentage change deviations over time between the first 'baseline' simulation run and the second 'policy' simulation run. For this paper, we use the standard baseline forecast and policy closures described in Dixon & Rimmer (2002: 262-274) . The nominal exchange rate is set as the numeraire in the policy run.
Simulations

Baseline Forecast
The baseline forecast is a necessary first step in order to conduct the policy simulation as it establishes a business-as-usual baseline path for the economy.
Figures 2 and 3 show the main macro and industry level variables for which explicit 7 We do a baseline forecast of the economy, change the closure of the model to the policy closure that will be used later in the policy simulation, and re-generate the baseline forecast with it. From here, we may now apply any set of additional policy shocks to the exogenous variables. If we would run a policy simulation where no additional shocks are applied to the policy variables, the original baseline forecast values would be the result of the simulation. This makes it legitimate to interpret differences between results in the policy and baseline runs as the effects of the policy shocks.
non-zero forecast values were imposed over the simulation period up to and 2030. nominal electricity prices are expected to grow by 241.9 per cent and electricity generation capacity is expected to grow by 50.7 per cent over the forecast period.
The Policy Scenarios
The first policy scenario implemented in this paper is designed to isolate and 
Policy Simulation Results (First Scenario)
The policy simulation results produced by UPGEM are reported as cumulative percentage deviations away from the baseline. Interpreting the results of our policy simulation requires special attention in this application. Since we know that Medupi and Kusile will be built and brought online over the period 2014-2019, and our aim is to better understand its role and contribution in the economy, our counterfactual policy scenario eliminates the additional capacity scheduled to come online from these two sources. The absolute value of the deviation from the baseline, in the policy run, may then be interpreted as its contribution.
Three separate tables are used to present the results of the policy run. The first (Horridge, 2000) . These tables are presented at the end of this section.
When C: Electricity output growth in the baseline was forecasted to be 21.1% in 2019, which represents total electricity capacity of 53297MW D: Electricity output growth in the policy simulation is forecasted to be 3.5% in 2019 which represents total electricity capacity of 45533MW E: Electricity output growth in the baseline was forecasted to be 50.61% in 2030, which represents total electricity capacity of 66268MW F: Electricity output growth in the policy simulation is forecasted to be 28.7% in 2030, which represents total electricity capacity of 56615MW G: Electricity output from 2020 and beyond grows at 2.0% per annum in both the baseline and the policy simulation The next impact to be examined after the exogenous change to electricity output capacity in the policy run should be electricity prices. In the baseline, electricity prices are exogenously set according to Eskom's projected multi-year price determination (MYPD3) framework. In the policy run we allow electricity prices to closure setting is required in order to achieve sensible policy simulation results within a general equilibrium model. In the unlikely event that regulators do not allow electricity prices to change relative to the baseline after such a large exogenous shock to electricity output, we may simply adjust our interpretation of any changes to electricity prices predicted in the policy simulation as a change in the excess demand for electricity.
First Round of Impact of the Shock to the Electricity Industry Output
Electricity prices start rising immediately, relative to the baseline, after the imposition of our policy shock that reduces electricity output. By 2030, electricity prices are cumulatively 118.4 per cent higher relative to the baseline. That is, by eliminating Medupi and Kusile's additional power generation, electricity prices would need to more than double relative to the baseline, if allowed to move freely, in order to clear the market. This result is not surprising given our policy simulation designthe scarcer a commodity becomes the higher its value is likely to become. Within the context of this paper and the regulatory environment in South Africa, we may interpret this result, as showing that Medupi and Kusile's capacity will significantly reduce the excess demand for electricity, and subsequent blackouts, in the economy over the simulation period. The impact on macroeconomic and industry variables, explained next in sub-sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 respectively, follows directly from the exogenous shock imposed on electricity output described in this section.
Macroeconomic Results
As shown in Table 1 , the macroeconomic impacts following the shock to the electricity industry are generally negative, as may be expected given our simulation design. Real GDP falls by 0.44 per cent in 2014 alone and with 3.15 per cent by In our policy run, the depressing effect caused by the fall in GDP initially reduces inflation. However, the long-term impact of the supply-side constraints imposed in the policy run ultimately increases inflation with 2.47 per cent by 2020 and 1.75 per cent by 2030, relative to the baseline. The higher level of inflation is mainly caused by the general equilibrium impact of the significantly higher price of electricity. With less electricity available at higher prices, it is no surprise that this supply shock will cause inflation to rise. We can therefore view the role of Medupi and Kusile as improving the productive capacity in the country over the medium to long term, thereby reducing cost-push inflation in the long run.
As expected, with real GDP falling, all components from both the income and the expenditure side also contract relative to the baseline. The exception is exports, The results regarding labour are also interesting. As may be expected with significantly lower production and capital creation occurring in the short to medium term, employment also initially falls in line with these variables. However, the biggest impact on the labour market in the long run is due to reduced levels of productivity, stemming from the lack of electricity generation capacity and investment expenditure. This causes real wages, often seen as an indicator of labour productivity in the long run, to fall dramatically over the simulation period. By 2020 real wages are down 7.97 per cent and by 11.84 in 2030, relative to the baseline.
The slightly higher employment levels seen in 2030 should therefore be interpreted alongside the outcome of significantly lower real wages. Should Medupi and Kusile be brought online as expected in the baseline, its contribution on a macroeconomic level is therefore shown as being unambiguously good for the economy. 
Industry Results
As shown in Table 2 , on an industry level, the electricity and construction industries are the biggest contributors to the negative changes in overall industry output. This is expected given that these are the two industries most directly affected by the shock imposed in the policy simulation. The electricity industry is directly affected by the restriction in electricity output growth imposed during the 2014-2019
period. The construction industry is affected by the significant slowdown in investment activities that arises as a consequence of the shock. This can also be associated with the adjustment of the economy to a lower capital stock, which consequently causes a negative deviation in the ratio of investment relative to GDP.
The iron and steel industry, a heavy user of electricity as an intermediate input, is also negatively affected by the policy, with industry prices significantly higher over time relative to the baseline, leading to production and export demand in the industry declining strongly relative to the baseline.
Export-oriented industries such as mining and tourism related services seem to be taking advantage of the real devaluation of the currency immediately after the shock, and do relatively well for the period 2014-2016, given the overall performance of the economy. As confirmed in Table 3 , the electricity and construction industries are the biggest losers when looking at the domestic market effect in isolation. The electricity industry is down as a consequence of the imposed shock. Since the electricity industry uses a lot of coal as inputs, the coal mining industry loses in the domestic market, which slightly depresses coal prices. However, it is able to partially offset this loss in the domestic market with increased exports, making coal a relative winner in overall net terms. 
Policy Simulation Results (Second Scenario)
Our second policy scenario adds further empirical evidence of the effects of a lack of adequate electricity supply on the local economy's growth prospects. By simulating a two-year delay in the build programme of Medupi and Kusile, we are able to quantify the impact of such a delay, which serves to inform policymakers and key stakeholders in making their projections. Latest reports from Eskom indicate that a two-year delay, relative to the original build schedule, is likely given the labour disruptions that have occurred on site and technical difficulties that have been encountered.
Simulation results for our second scenario indicate that GDP will be as high as 1 per cent below base in 2017 and only return to baseline levels in 2022, one year after Medupi and Kusile have been fully brought online. Figure 5 shows this deviation in GDP growth, relative to the baseline, for the second policy scenario. These simulation results provide further evidence regarding the urgency of restoring adequate electricity supply in order to facilitate the levels of growth the country envision in its baseline projections.
General Remarks
As noted throughout this section, the generally negative results found in the first policy simulation could be inverted if we wish to use our analysis to measure the expected contribution of Medupi and Kusile in the South African economy. In this way, our results clearly show the additional generation capacity scheduled to come from these new power plants will improve the economy's ability to grow and attract investment.
Conclusion and Policy Implications
This paper analysed the economy-wide contribution that the additional electricity generation capacity from Medupi and Kusile will bring to the South African economy in the medium to long run. We used a dynamic CGE model to conduct our analysis. In order to isolate and measure the contribution of Medupi and Kusile, we Although this share will gradually decline up to 2030 as other sources of electricity come online, its contribution in terms of facilitating economic growth and investment is shown to remain crucial throughout the simulation period. The environmental impacts of these two new coal-fired power stations were not explicitly accounted for in our CGE analysis.
The first conclusion that emerged from our analysis was that economic growth will be severely harmed in the medium term without the additional electricity generation capacity scheduled to be brought online through Medupi and Kusile. This result also supports the view that inadequate electricity capacity in recent years has already cost the South African economy billions of Rands. The results from our second policy simulation scenario also highlight the short-term losses the economy will suffer should there be further delays in the completion of the new power stations.
On a macro level, we found that investment expenditure, in particular, is heavily dependent on the expected growth in electricity capacity and infrastructure. Up to 2019, around 10 per cent of investment activity is facilitated, directly or indirectly, by the building of Medupi and Kusile. Given its close link to real investment expenditure on a macro level, the construction industry gains the most from the additional activity allowed for by the building of these two power stations over this period.
The second conclusion that emerged from the modelling simulations was that the problem of excess demand relative to tight supply in the electricity market will be greatly relieved once the additional capacity from Medupi and Kusile is installed. The current conditions, which have contributed to widespread blackouts and load shedding (the local term for electricity rationing) in the country since 2008, must be considered within the context of electricity's regulated pricing structure. Eskom is not allowed to automatically raise electricity prices when demand exceeds supply, as might be the case in other free market enterprises. The model shows us that if electricity prices were subject to market forces, the building of Medupi and Kusile's additional capacity would have contributed to a significant slowdown in electricity price increases over the next decade. Within the context of Eskom as a state-owned enterprise subject to regulated pricing, we interpret this particular result as showing that the building of Medupi and Kusile will lead to fewer blackouts as adequate reserve margins in the electricity sector are restored.
Overall, the research presented in this study shows that the local economy will benefit significantly through the new power generation scheduled to come from On the second issue, our simulation results clearly show the need for both stations' additional capacity in order to facilitate economic growth, prevent widespread blackouts and reduce upward pressure on electricity prices. Our results also suggest that growth in electricity demand will be large enough to warrant the building of Medupi and Kusile, despite recent and projected increases in electricity prices. One exception applies to this projection. In the event that significant technological progress in combination with appropriate economic policy changes, as suggested in Inglesi-Lotz & Blignaut (2014) , allows users to require or demand much less electricity to fulfil their energy needs, leading to an improvement in energy efficiency, the second of the two new coal-fired power stations may well prove to deliver excess capacity to the economy in the near term. However, if we are to replace the existing fleet of old coal-fired plants, the capacity of both new stations will be required in order to provide adequate base load.
This paper only considered the economic impact of additional electricity capacity scheduled to come online in South Africa through Medupi and Kusile.
Further research, already in-progress as described in Bohlmann, J.A. et al. (2015) , is required to get a more holistic view of the impact and requirements regarding South Africa's future electricity generation capacity and mix. In addition, recent work on the estimation of electricity price elasticities during a period of interrupted and constrained supply; different financing options for future build programs and their implications; environmental considerations; implementation of a carbon-tax; new technologies becoming viable and cost implications of moving to renewable sources of electricity must all be carefully considered within a detailed general equilibrium framework. The importance and need for continued research in this field should not be underestimated. Source: Adapted from Eskom (2014b Eskom ( , 2014d 1) Medupi has a total capacity of 4800MW, with 6 Units of 800MW each, here we are assuming that the first unit will join the power grid in December 2014, with every extra unit being activated in 8 months intervals (as suggested by Eskom, 2014d) 2) Kusile has a total capacity of 4800MW, with 6 units of 800MW each, here we are assuming that the first unit will join the power grid in --up to----up to -- Nominal Exchange Rate (phi) -11,90 -9,00 -5,28 -6,06 -6,00 -5,84 -5,56 -5,39 -5,31 -5,28 -5,27 -5,26 -5,26 -5,27 -5,27 -5,28 -5,28 -5,29 -5,30 -5,97 Real GDP (x0gdpexp 
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